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ETHICS
Client-Attorney Personal Relationship Test
The Supreme Court of the United States, in National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button,,
recently reversed both the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal's
ruling' on a conviction of the N.A.A.C.P. and the court's
upholding of the constitutionality of a Virginia act3 making
illegal the improper solicitation of legal business, or the
receiving of compensation from any person so soliciting,
where such person has no pecuniary right or liability in the
suit for which the attorney was solicited. It is submitted that
the Supreme Court of the United States correctly reversed the
decision on the constitutionality of the Virginia act, but
erroneously dismissed the conviction as stated under the
indictment.
In a series of suits preceding the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeal's decision in N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison,4 three chapters
of the Acts of the Assembly, Extra Session, 1956, had been
held unconstitutional. The N.A.A.C.P. appealed rulings
adverse to them on § § 54-74 and 54-79 of the Virginia Code
as amended by chapter 33 of the Acts of the Assembly, Extra
Session, 1956, and §§ 18-349.31 to 18-349.37 inclusive of the
Virginia Code as amended by chapter 36, and in N.A.A.C.P. v.
Harrison the Virginia Court upheld §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 as
amended while it declared §§ 18-349.31 to 18-349.37 inclusive
as amended (which made it illegal for non-relatives to advise
persons to instigate suits) to be a violation of the First Amend-
ment of State and Federal Constitution. 5
1 83 S.Ct. 328 (1963).
2 N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960).
3 Chapter 33, Acts of Assembly, Extra Session, 1956, amending §§ 54-74, 54-78,
54-79, Code of 1950 (1958 Rep. Vol.).
4 N.A.A.C.P. v. Patty, 159 F.Supp. 503 (E.D. Va., 1958), struck down chap-
ters 31, 32, and 35. On appeal in N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, 360 U.S. 167,
(1959), reversed and remanded N.A.A.C.P. v. Patty for an authoritative
interpretation of these statutes by the Virginia courts. The Circuit Court
of the City of Richmond in N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, Chancery causes No.
B-2879 and No. B-2880, August 31, 1962, upheld the rulings of un-
constitutionality for chapters 31, 32, and 35, but ruled chapters 33 and
36 valid.
5 202 Va. 142, 164-165, 116 S.E.2d 55, 72 (1960).
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It is necessary to study the logic of the Virginia Court's
decision in N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison in order to understand the
error it made that left the Supreme Court of the United States
in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button no choice but to reverse the holding
of the constitutionality of §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79.
The Virginia Code, § § 54-74, 54-78, 54-79, independent of
the Virginia court's interpretation, in essence modifies canons
35 and 47 of the professional ethics of the American Bar
Association,' which prohibits the solicitation of litigation by
intermediaries and prohibits lawyers from receiving com-
pensation from any such intermediary not a party to the case.
On the other hand, §§ 18-349.31 to 18-349.37 inclusive,
which did violate the freedom of speech clause, was dismissed
with this comment: "A state may forbid one to practice law
without a license, but it cannot prevent an unlicensed person
from making a speech before an assembly, telling them of
their rights and urging them to assert Same."
The Virginia court concluded rightly that as the two laws
stood, §3 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 were constitutional, and that
§ § 18-349.31 to 18-349.37 inclusive were unconstitutional. Yet
in apparent disregard of the above quoted decision on §§
18-349.31 to 18-349.37 inclusive, the court went on to con-
clude:
Therefore,
(a) the appellants and those associated with them
may not be prohibited from acquainting persons with
6 Canon 35 provides: Intermediaries.-The professional services of a lawyer
should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal or cor-
porate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsi-
bility and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations
which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such
intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the
responsibility should be direct to the client. Charitable societies rendering
aid to the indigents are not deemed such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an
association, club or trade organization, to render legal services in any
matter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this
employment should not include the rendering of legal services to the
members of such an organization in respect to their individual affairs.
Canon 47 states: Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law.-No lawyer
shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be used in aid of,
or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any law agency,
personal or corporate.
7 202 Va. 142, 163, 116 S.E.2d 55, 71 (1960).
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what they believe to be their legal rights and advising
them to assert their rights by commencing or further
prosecuting a suit against the Commonwealth of Virginia,
... but in so advising persons to commence or further prosecute
such suits the appellants, or those associated with them, shall not
solicit legal business8 for their attorneys or any particular attor-
neys; . .. (emphasis added)
The italicized portion of the court's decision affirms nothing
found in § § 54-74, 54-78, or 54-79, but rather broadly construes
these sections as legalizing the indictment of persons for the
crime of recommending lawyers. "Improper" solicitation
(the language of the statute) must therefore be interpreted
as the recommendation of a lawyer, and this is indeed an
extremely vague and general denial of freedom of speech.
If strictly abided by, it would undoubtedly deny to many a
lawyer his prospective clients, simply because his successful
clients could only recommend him under possible criminal
penalties. This editorialized non-sequitur by the Virginia
court should have been omitted, and its omission would have
logically removed the United States Supreme Court's ground
for reversal.
We conclude that under Chapter 33, as authoritatively
construed by the Supreme Court of Appeals, a person who
advises another that his legal rights have been infringed
and refers him to a particular attorney or group of attorneys
... for assistance has committed a crime, as has the
attorney who knowingly renders assistance under such
circumstances. There thus inheres in the statute the
gravest danger of smothering all discussion looking to the
eventual institution of litigation on behalf of the rights of
members of an unpopular minority. Lawyers ... would
understandably hesitate to do what the decree purports to
allow, namely, acquaint "persons with what they believe
to be their legal rights and *** (advise) them to assert
their rights by commencing or further prosecuting a suit
***." For if the lawyers ... also appeared in or had any
connection with any litigation they would plainly risk
(if lawyers) disbarment proceedings and, lawyers and non-
8202 Va. 142, 165, 116 S.E.2d 55, 72 (1960).
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lawyers alike, criminal prosecution for the offense of
"solicitation", to which the Virginia court gave so broad
and uncertain a meaning. 9
This conclusion of the Supreme Court contains no error
in logic, based as it is upon the Virginia court's error. As will
be demonstrated in support of the next contention, the Vir-
ginia court should have interpreted the statute less in terms
of solicitation and more in terms of maintenance, the receiving
of funds from solicitors. This is the area of the statute that
the federal court does not discuss, and it is the failure to
recognize this area of N.A.A.C.P. activities which violate the
common law precepts of maintenance which caused the
Supreme Court of the United States to err in dismissing the
conviction of the N.A.A.C.P.
The N.A.A.C.P., despite the unconstitutionality of § § 54-74,
54-78 and 54-79, nevertheless violated two canons of legal
ethics and the long-standing common law offense of mainte-
nance as widely understood in the United States in general
and Virginia in particular. To understand specifically the
offense involved it is necessary to understand its background.
The bulk of the English statute on maintenance dates
between 1275 and 1540.1 0 American courts have uniformly
held these acts to be declaratory of pre-existing common
law, " I including the exceptions in favor of giving support
to needy relatives in order that they may presssuits. Virginia
in its present constitution, accepts as the common law of the
Commonwealth the common law of England as of 1607, in
so far as it was not repugnant to the Constitution and Bill
of Rights and was not altered by the General Assembly.13
This clause has been interpreted as "reasonable and substantial
compliance with the common law, rather than a literal one.. ",1"
The force of this continuing substantial compliance with
9 NA.A.C.P. v. Harrison, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338-339 (1963).
10 E. g., 3 Edw. 1, c. 25 (1275); 32 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1540).
l1 5 R.C.L. Champerry and Maintenance § 4 (1929).
12 Halsbury, Laws of England, 52 (1907).
13 Va. Code Ann. § 1-10 (1950).
14 Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 310, 31 S.E. 503, 505 (1898).
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common law is readily apparent in Wiseman v. Common-
wealth, 15 where the court in the area related to maintenance,
stated that where a statute codifies part of a violation of the
common law (embracing in this particular case), violations of
common law embracery outside the statute are indictable
and punishable with what is the common law on this subject
as it has developed from the common law of England as of
1607. 16 In this case, where the indictment alleged circum-
stances violating the common law, but omitted the violation
of the statute, the court ruled the indictment sound in as much
as the statute did not abrogate the common law.1 7 This
raises the query: Why should an indictment be quashed
when it alleges circumstances violating both the common law
of maintenance and the violation of a statute which codifies
part of the common law, but in so doing adds extraneous
material and hence is unconstitutional? Obviously, in such
circumstances, the cause should be remanded with directions
to continue the case on the common law, since this was in no
way affected by the unconstitutionality of the statute.
This common law ground for the conviction of mainte-
nance today, in Virginia and elsewhere has apparently changed
character rather uniformly as the evils it was designed to
cure have altered with the changes in our judicial processes."
No longer do the courts look askance upon a third party
donating funds to press a suit to which they are not a part;
but they are unanimous, it appears, in standing behind the
canons of legal ethics in preventing the third party from main-
taining that suit by interjecting himself between the attorney
and his client and by so doing control the attorney's purse
strings. The Virginia Court, in Richmond Association of Credit
Men v. Bar Association, 1 9 adopted the position taken earlier
in New York in In re Co-operative Law Co.:20
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and
servant in a limited and dignified sense, and it involves
15 143 Va. 631, 130 S.E. 249 (1925).
16 Supra, note 15.
17 Supra, note 15.
18 5 R.C.L. Champerty and Maintenance § 5 (1929).
10 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937).
20 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
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the highest trust and confidence. It cannot be delegated
without consent, and cannot exist between an attorney
employed by a corporation to practice law for it, and a client
of the corporation, for he (the attorney) would be subject
to the direction of the corporation and not the direction
of the client."
The Michigan court in 1933 stated, "As long as the at-
torney owes, or deems he owes, to the middleman, any duty
connected with the plaintiff's case, so that he cannot extend
undivided allegiance to the client, he remains the agent of the
middleman." 22 In law suits under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, California, Illinois, and Tennessee have each
maintained that a union could not hire a lawyer to prosecute
suits for members of the union because of the intermediary
nature of the union. 23 The federal court, while holding it was
not reversible error, proclaimed such a railway union activity
a "violation of well recognized ethical and professional stand-
ards of long duration and virtually universal observance. '"24
In N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, the Virginia court went into
lengthy discussion of the Commonwealth's evidence in support
of its allegations about N.A.A.C.P. activities. The N.A.A.C.P.
lawyers receive from the N.A.A.C.P. Defense Fund $60.00
per day for their services in cases which the N.A.A.C.P. has
provided lawyers, "as long as such attorneys adhere strictly
to N.A.A.C.P. policies." 25 Many litigants had no personal
contact with their attorneys, 8 some did not even know their
lawyers' names. 2 7 Granted the legal right to aid the down-
trodden, the legal means must not be disregarded. The
N.A.A.C.P. has, it appears, effectively destroyed the attorney-
21 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910).
22 Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 262 Mich. 1, 247 N.W. 97 (1933).
23 In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 396, 150 N.E.2d 163
(1958); Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 36 Calif.2d 504, 225
P.2d 508 (1950); Doughty v. Gills, 37 Tenn.Ap. 63, 260 S.W.2d
379 (1952).
24 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390,
393 (10th Cir. 1956).
25 N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 149, 116 S.E.2d 55, 62 (1960).
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 63.
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client relationship in these cases, in a way it could not if the
attorneys followed not N.A.A.C.P. policy, but the will of
their clients. The attorneys follow the N.A.A.C.P. policies
because that is their job, the N.A.A.C.P. and not the client
is their employer.
The N.A.A.C.P. could, as a legal aid society, give prospec-
tive litigants funds to press suits, and recommend lawyers (the
illegal Virginia statute notwithstanding), but the N.A.A.C.P.
should not be allowed to continue violation of attorney-
client relationship. Funds given to the needy to support
litigation may be made upon only one contingency, that an
attorney's aid be sought, if it is abundantly clear that the
attorney need not be one of those recommended. Afterwards,
if the attorney convinces the client not to press the suit (because
he feels that it may result, however unjustly, in the closing of
all public schools), the N.A.A.C.P. funds so expended to
support litigation by indigents has been well spent, and the
N.A.A.C.P. has no complaint, simply because the client,
after being advised by a lawyer, decided not to instigate
litigation.
This distinction, between legally giving a client funds with
which to hire an attorney of his choice, and illegally offering
him an attorney's service, is essentially a distinction of who
is to control the attorney, and to be legal and just, the con-
trol of the attorney (including the purse strings) must always
reside in the hands of the client. As the N.A.A.C.P. has vio-
lated this longstanding legal principle of ethical conduct and
of common law, there is no reason for the dismissal of the con-
viction. Granted the correctness of the federal court's ruling
on the unconstitutionality of § § 54-74, 54-78, and 54-79 of the
Virginia Code, the United States Supreme Court, to serve the
law, should not have dismissed the suit, but should have
remanded the case to be retried on indictment based on the
violation of the common law when the statute was deemed
without force.
A.J. C.
